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Tell all the Truth but tell it slant — 
Success in Circuit lies 
Too bright for our infirm Delight 
The Truth’s superb surprise 
As Lightning to the Children eased 
With explanation kind 
The Truth must dazzle gradually 
Or every man be blind – 
 
Emily Dickinson 
 
 
 †  Attorney, Lindquist & Vennum, PLLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota.  B.A. 
1978, College of St. Thomas; J.D. 1981, Harvard Law School. 
1
Fleming: Telling the Truth Slant—Defending Insider Trading Claims against
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2002
03_FLEMMING 4/18/2002  4:59 PM 
1422 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:4 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
Insider trading cases against legal and financial professionals 
tend to be hotly litigated disputes over factual rather than legal 
issues.  Defending these cases requires a persuasive, slanted 
presentation that explains in a consistent  and credible manner the 
defendant’s conduct and transactions and supports the defendant’s 
good faith in the face of what is ordinarily a multi-layered but 
exclusively circumstantial case that the defendant engaged in 
fraudulent and deceptive securities transactions. 
II. BACKGROUND. 
A.  The Development of Insider Trading Liability. 
Insider trading liability may arise in the context of criminal, 
civil or administrative proceedings.  The U.S. Department of Justice 
has jurisdiction to pursue criminal actions.  The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), self-regulatory agencies, and state 
securities enforcement agencies may initiate civil and 
administrative proceedings based on insider trading allegations.  
Private parties may also bring civil claims based on insider trading 
allegations. 
Insider trading claims are frequently pursued against classic 
insiders - officers and directors of corporations, who in the regular 
course of their duties have access to material, nonpublic 
information.  Professionals assisting those corporations, officers 
and directors—lawyers, investment bankers and other financial 
advisors—frequently have access to this same information in the 
normal course of providing professional services.  Indeed, it is not 
surprising that many insider trading claims are brought against 
these professionals, who are sometimes characterized as “temporary 
insiders” by virtue of their temporary access to inside information.1 
1.  The Traditional or Classical Theory. 
Insider trading liability is ordinarily based on a violation of 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-
 
 1. See Robert S. Karmel, Insider Trading: Law, Policy and Theory after O’Hagan, 
20 CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 84 n.6 (1998) (“Attorneys, more than any other group, 
have been prosecuted for insider trading.”).  Id. 
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5 thereunder.2  Liability for trading on inside information is usually 
premised on Rule 10b-5’s ban on fraudulent acts or practices.  
“Under the ‘traditional’ or ‘classical’ theory of insider trading . . . 
Rule 10b-5 [is] violated when a corporate insider trades in [that 
corporation’s securities] on the basis of material, nonpublic 
information.”3 
Initially, the prohibition against insider trading was articulated 
as a “disclose or abstain” rule.  This rule required a corporate 
insider with a fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders 
to either disclose material, inside information or abstain from 
trading in the corporation’s stock.  That rule was first stated in 
Cady, Roberts & Co.,4 where the SEC found a director of a company 
passing on an inside tip had violated the obligation to “disclose or 
abstain.”  In that case, the director, who was also a broker, 
recommended that his customers sell the company’s stock based on 
a tip from a corporate insider of a dividend cut.  The SEC noted 
the existence of a relationship allowing access to inside information 
intended only for a legitimate corporate purpose, and the 
unfairness of permitting an insider to take advantage of that 
information by trading without disclosure.5  The Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals and ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court, 
subsequently endorsed this “disclose or abstain” rule.6 
The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently found that, in a face-to-
face transaction, a buyer with inside information about a company 
has a duty to disclose such information to the seller before 
consummating a transaction.7 
At least initially, the scope of insider trading liability was fairly 
limited, and only applicable in situations where the insider had a 
fiduciary duty to the party with whom the insider traded, or to the 
 
 2. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2001); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001).  Insider 
trading liability under federal securities law may also be predicated on section 
14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 14e-3 thereunder 
(concerning tender offers), and Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(concerning short-swing profits).  Insider trading liability may also arise from 
violation of state blue sky laws. 
 3. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997). 
 4. Cady, Roberts & Co., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 34-
6668, 40 SEC 907 (Nov. 8, 1961). 
 5. Id. at 917-918. 
 6. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226-227 (1980); SEC v. Texas 
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 7. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-53 
(1972). 
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corporation, or shareholders of the corporation, whose securities 
were traded.  That is, absent a fiduciary relationship, trading on 
material, non-public information did not create insider trading 
liability. 
The Supreme Court first examined this requirement of a 
fiduciary relationship in an insider trading case in Chiarella v. 
United States.8  In that case, a printing firm was hired to produce 
documents for various tender offers.9  The target company’s 
identity was concealed in the galleys.10  Chiarella, a printer 
employed by the firm, was able to identify the target company by 
reading the other information in the tender offer materials, and he 
proceeded to purchase the target company’s stock.11  The Court 
found Chiarella had no legal duty to the target company, absent a 
wrongful conversion or misappropriation, and therefore did not 
violate the insider trading laws.12  Significantly, the Court expressly 
did not determine whether Chiarella breached a duty to his 
employer, the printer.13 
Generally, a public company is not required to promptly 
disclose all material corporate developments.14  Moreover, as the 
Chiarella Court recognized, there is no general ban on trading on 
non-public information, even without disclosure.15  For example, 
brokers and their clients can trade on the basis of lawfully obtained 
non-public information, and this information advantage is thought 
to contribute to an efficient market.16 
The “disclose or abstain” rule was subsequently extended to 
third party “tippees” - individuals who trade based on tips from 
insiders.  In Dirks v. SEC,17 the Court held that a tippee violates Rule 
10b-5 when the insider who disclosed this information did so in 
violation of the insider’s fiduciary duty to the company or its 
shareholders.18  In this case, Dirks, an investment analyst, 
investigated a company and determined that the company’s assets 
 
 8. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
 9. Id. at 224. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 232-33. 
 13. Id. at 235-37. 
 14. Karmel, supra note 1, at 119. 
 15. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234 n.16. 
 16. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233. 
 17. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 18. Id. at 660. 
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had been fraudulently inflated.19  He disclosed this to the Wall 
Street Journal, which refused to publish, but word spread to 
investors.20  The stock fell more than $10 during a two-week 
period.21  The Court found that “a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty 
to . . . shareholders of a corporation . . . when the insider has 
breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders” and “the tippee 
knows or should know that there has been a breach.”22 
In an oft-cited footnote, the Court also said: 
Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate 
information is revealed legitimately to an underwriter, 
accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for the 
corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of 
the shareholders.  The basis for recognizing this fiduciary 
duty is not simply that such persons acquired nonpublic 
corporate information, but rather that they have entered 
into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of 
the business of the enterprise and are given access to 
information solely for corporate purposes . . . .  For such a 
duty to be imposed, however, the corporation must expect 
the outsider to keep the disclosed nonpublic information 
confidential, and the relationship at least must imply such 
a duty.23 
The Court emphasized, however, that a fiduciary duty arises 
not merely when such persons have acquired material, nonpublic 
information, but because they have entered into a special, 
confidential relationship and are provided access to information 
solely for legitimate corporate purposes.24 
In sum, these cases recognize that a fiduciary relationship 
arises between a corporate insider and the corporation and its 
shareholders, as a result of the insider’s employment as an officer 
or director for the corporation.  Under these circumstances, an 
insider with material, non-public information has the obligation 
either to disclose the information, or abstain from trading in the 
corporation’s securities.  Professionals who obtain such 
information from insiders in the regular course of their 
employment, and tippees with knowledge that the insider tipper 
 
 19. Id. at 649-50. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 660. 
 23. Id. at 655 n.14 (citations omitted). 
 24. Id. at 654. 
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has breached a fiduciary duty to the corporation by passing on 
inside information, have the same obligations as insiders under this 
rule. 
2.  The Misappropriation Theory. 
The traditional or classical theory of insider trading liability 
does not encompass circumstances where a person who is not a 
corporate insider (and furthermore, not a tippee or a professional 
who obtains the information while providing professional services 
to the corporation) trades the corporation’s securities on the basis 
of material, nonpublic information obtained in a manner that did 
not involve an insider’s breach of a fiduciary duty.  The “disclose or 
abstain” rule does not apply to situations where the trader obtains 
the information from sources other than the corporation whose 
securities are traded, or where there is no breach of a fiduciary duty 
to that corporation. 
Because of this limitation, aggressive prosecutors and 
regulators sought to expand the scope of insider trading liability to 
situations where the trader obtained material, non-public 
information by breaching a fiduciary duty other than a duty owed 
to the corporation whose securities are traded.  This broader 
theory of insider trading liability—called “the misappropriation 
theory”—bars trading by an insider even when the securities being 
traded are not those of the insider’s employer.  Under this theory, 
a person violates Rule 10b-5 by misappropriating someone else’s 
information in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the source of the 
information (rather than the company whose stock is being 
traded). 
The misappropriation theory departs significantly from the 
narrow “disclose or abstain” rule.  Under this rule, fraud consists of 
the deception inherent in a securities transaction where the insider 
conceals important information from the other party to the 
transaction.  The focus is on the relationship between the insider 
and the other trader.  The misappropriation theory, by contrast, 
does not restrict itself to the fraud perpetrated on those who buy 
from or sell to the inside trader.  Instead, it broadens the inquiry to 
determine whether the “insider” has obtained the material, non-
public information wrongfully - in breach of a duty owed to the 
source of the information. 
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For example, in United States v. Elliott,25 Elliot, a former law firm 
partner, was successfully prosecuted based on the misappropriation 
theory.26  Elliott learned confidential non-public information about 
the planned acquisition of a large block of stock and subsequently 
purchased stock in the target company.27  The government 
proceeded under the misappropriation theory.28  The court 
adopted the theory, finding that the statute’s language was broad 
enough to cover misappropriation as a violation of section 10(b).29  
The court characterized attorneys as “quasi-insiders,” and found a 
fiduciary relationship between the shareholders of a corporation 
and the corporation’s lawyer when corporate information is 
revealed legitimately and solely for corporate purposes.30  The 
court noted that, before a fiduciary duty can be deemed to exist, 
“the corporation must expect the [attorney] to keep the disclosed 
nonpublic information confidential, and the relationship . . . must 
imply such a duty.”31 
As a further example, in SEC v. Willis,32 a psychiatrist tipped his 
broker some inside information he had received from a patient.33  
With this inside information, the broker tipped friends and traded 
in the accounts of several customers.34  The Court rejected the 
broker’s motion to dismiss, finding that the broker knew or was 
reckless in not knowing that the information had been 
misappropriated in breach of the psychiatrist’s duty to his patient, 
and it was irrelevant for purposes of establishing insider trading 
liability that the patient was not herself a party to the securities 
transaction.35 
 
 25. 711 F. Supp. 425 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
 26. Id. at 432. 
 27. Id. at 425-26. 
 28. Id. at 430. 
 29. Id. at 431-32. 
 30. Id. at 432. 
 31. Id. 
 32. 777 F. Supp. 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 33. Id. at 1168. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 1172.  See also United States v. Falcone, 97 F. Supp. 2d 297 (E.D.N.Y. 
2000).  In Falcone, a securities broker profited from stock information received 
from the friend of a business magazine’s employee. Id. at 300.  The employee had 
access to a business magazine containing information and advice about publicly 
held companies.  Id.  The employee gained access to the magazine prior to public 
dissemination.  Id.  The broker was found guilty despite the lack of a clear 
fiduciary duty between the broker and tipper.  Id. at 301-02; See also SEC v. Singer, 
786 F. Supp. 1158, 1161-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (explaining how lawyer used 
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Tippees who receive misappropriated information may be 
liable for insider trading under the misappropriation theory even if 
the tipper - the provider of the misappropriated information - did 
not trade on that information.  Tippee liability is imposed upon 
proof of “a breach by the tipper of a duty owed to the owner of the 
material nonpublic information and the tippee’s knowledge that 
the tipper had breached the duty.”36 
The U.S. Supreme Court endorsed the misappropriation 
theory for the first time in United States v. O’Hagan.37  In that case, 
O’Hagan was an attorney whose firm was retained by Grand 
Metropolitan PLC in connection with a proposed acquisition of the 
Pillsbury Company.38  Before Grand Metropolitan publicly 
announced its tender offer for Pillsbury stock, O’Hagan purchased 
2,500 Pillsbury call option contracts and approximately 5,000 
shares of Pillsbury common stock.39  O’Hagan realized a profit of 
over $4 million from these transactions.40  Since O’Hagan was not 
an “insider” of Pillsbury, the corporation in whose shares he traded, 
the government proceeded against O’Hagan under the 
misappropriation theory.41 
The government claimed that O’Hagan breached a fiduciary 
duty to his law firm and Grand Metropolitan when, through his 
employment at the law firm, he obtained material, non-public 
information concerning Grand Metropolitan’s interest in acquiring 
Pillsbury, and subsequently used that information as a basis for 
trading in Pillsbury securities.  The Supreme Court agreed that the 
misappropriation theory is a permissible basis for imposing section 
10(b) liability.42 
The O’Hagan Court left open the question of the type of 
relationship that creates a fiduciary duty for insider trading 
purposes.  Presumably, a fiduciary duty often exists between an 
employee and an employer, and a professional and a client.  It is 
not clear whether this duty exists in other relationships, especially 
 
confidential client information to trade in non-client’s stock).  See generally 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Under the Restatement of the Law Governing 
Lawyers, 19 J. CORP. L. 1 (1993). 
 36. United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 600 (2d Cir. 1993); see also United 
States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226, 232 (2d Cir. 2001); 
 37. 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 38. Id. at 647. 
 39. Id. at 647-48. 
 40. Id. at 648. 
 41. Id. at 649. 
 42. Id. at 653. 
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non-business relationships, such as between family members or 
between friends. 
In August 2000, the SEC implemented a new rule addressing 
this issue.  The SEC’s new Rule 10b5-2 clarifies how the 
misappropriation theory applies to certain non-business 
relationships.43  Under this rule, a person receiving confidential 
information could be liable under the following circumstances: 
a.  The person agreed to keep the information confidential; 
b.  The persons involved in the communication had a pattern 
or practice of sharing confidences that resulted in a 
reasonable expectation of confidentiality; or 
c.  The person providing the information was a spouse, parent, 
child, or sibling of the person receiving the information.44 
B.  Materiality. 
Trading on inside information is prohibited only if that 
information is material.  Theoretically, materiality is determined as 
of the time of the trade.  Of course, that determination is made 
after-the-fact, by a fact-finder with full knowledge of the events 
occurring after the trade.  It is difficult, as a practical matter, for 
that fact-finder not to be influenced by hindsight. 
The U. S. Supreme Court has defined materiality as follows: 
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial 
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it 
important in deciding how to [act] . . . .  Put another way, 
there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure 
of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the 
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 
‘total mix’ of information made available.45 
At the time of the trade, it may be extremely difficult to 
determine whether particular inside information is material.  If an 
individual makes a trade solely on the basis of that information, it is 
fair to assume that the information was material to that individual.  
Presumably, under those circumstances, the individual acted on 
that information, and considered the information important 
enough to rely upon it making an investment.  In most cases, 
 
 43. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2000). 
 44. Id. 
 45. TSC Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); see Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (adopting the TSC Indus. standard of 
materiality for § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). 
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however, there are myriad reasons why an investor makes an 
investment at a particular time. 
Because the standard for determining materiality is the 
“reasonable shareholder,” materiality is often a fact-bound 
determination.  Motions for judgment on the pleadings and 
summary judgment are rarely granted, and the decision on 
materiality is ordinarily reserved for the fact-finder. 
Recent cases suggest some guidelines for determining 
materiality.  For example, in Berreman v. West Publishing Co.,46 the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals held that a company’s retention of an 
investment banker for purposes of exploring restructuring or 
merger alternatives is not material nonpublic information for 
securities law purposes.47 
In Berreman, Thomas Berreman, was a long-time West 
Publishing Co. employee who owned some of that company’s 
closely-held common stock.48  In April 1995, Berreman told West’s 
Chief Executive Officer that he intended to retire effective June 1, 
1995.49  His last day of work was May 31, 1995, and on June 1, 1995, 
Berreman redeemed his 1,600 shares of West common stock at the 
then-current book value of $2,088.90 per share.50 
When he redeemed his shares on June 1, 1995, Berreman was 
not aware of these events: 1) during the second week of May 1995, 
West’s Chief Financial Officer concluded that West should consider 
being acquired or enter into a joint venture; 2) on May 17, 1995, 
West’s directors met with an investment banking firm to obtain 
advice about the company’s future financial options, including a 
possible sale of the company, and 3) on May 23, 1995, the West 
board authorized its investment bankers to explore financing 
options beyond West’s local bank.51  Subsequently, on August 29, 
1995, West publicly announced that it had engaged investment 
bankers and was considering alternative financial options.52  In 
September 1995, West sent out requests for bids to potential 
acquirers.53  In February, 1996, West entered into a merger 
 
 46. 615 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000). 
 47. Id. at 375. 
 48. Id. at 366. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 366-67. 
 53. Id. at 367. 
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agreement with Thomson Corporation.54  In June 1996, Thomson 
paid $10,445 per share to acquire West.55 
Based on these facts, Berreman claimed that West and three of 
its directors breached fiduciary duties owed to him, and that they 
committed fraud.56  Berreman’s claims required the court to 
consider when preliminary merger discussions become “material” 
for purposes of fraud.  Drawing upon the analysis set forth in Basic 
Inc. v. Levinson57 and other federal securities law cases, the court 
stated that the test for materiality required a balancing of both the 
“indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated 
magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company 
activity.”58  Applying that balancing test, the court held that a 
corporate decision to explore restructuring options, including the 
possible sale of the company, coupled with the retention of an 
investment banker, was immaterial as a matter of law.59 
As another example, in SEC v. Thrasher,60 the court in denying 
summary judgment, rejected the defendant’s claim that that he 
could not be liable for insider trading on the basis of a false rumor 
from an unreliable tipper.61  The defendant asserted that the 
information provided by the tipper proved largely false, and was 
inherently immaterial since the tippers were a nightclub promoter 
and a male prostitute dying of AIDS, both reputed to be dishonest 
and desperate for money.62  The SEC responded that the 
defendant’s behavior - researching and then purchasing the 
securities after receiving the information from the purportedly 
unreliable sources - indicated he did believe them.63  The Court 
noted that “[a] major factor in determining whether information 
was material is the importance attached to it by those who knew 
about it.”64  Accordingly, the Court determined that a reasonable 
jury could find that the information was material.65 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 371. 
 57. 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988). 
 58. Berremen, 615 N.W.2d at 371-72 (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 
224, 238 (1988)). 
 59. Id. at 373. 
 60. 152 F. Supp. 2d 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 61. Id. at 305. 
 62. Id. at 299. 
 63. Id. at 300. 
 64. Id. (quoting SEC v. Mayhew, 121 F.3d 44, 52 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
 65. Id. at 301. 
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C.  Non-public Information. 
Trading on material, inside information is prohibited only if 
that information is truly nonpublic.  “To constitute non-public 
information under the [1933 Securities Exchange] Act, 
information must be specific and more private than general 
rumor.”66  There is no securities law violation where “the disclosed 
information is so general that the recipient thereof is still 
“undertaking a substantial economic risk that his tempting target 
will prove to be a ‘white elephant.’”67  However, an insider’s 
confirmation of rumors that a company is in actual merger 
discussions, even if no specific details of the merger are provided, 
constitutes a tip of material non-public information.68 
D.  The Intent to Defraud. 
Scienter is a necessary element of a securities fraud violation.  
Scienter means the intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud.69  
Recklessness satisfies this scienter element, but is limited to 
those highly unreasonable omissions or 
misrepresentations that involve not merely simple or even 
inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from 
the standards of ordinary care, and that present a danger 
of misleading buyers or sellers which is either known to 
the defendant or is so obvious that the defendant must 
have been aware of it.70 
As a practical matter, concealment by the defendant before 
and after the transaction is often the basis for proving scienter.  A 
defendant who denies or attempts to conceal the existence of 
relationships or communications, and especially the fact of a 
transaction will find it more difficult to demonstrate good faith and 
defend against the claim that his activities were made with the 
 
 66. SEC v. Mayhew, 121 F.3d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. 
Mylett, 97 F.3d 663, 666 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
 67. Id. at 52 (citations and internal quotations marks omitted). 
 68. Id. (citing United States v. Mylett, 97 F.3d 663, 667 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 69. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976). 
 70. K & S P’ship v. Cont’l Bank, N.A., 952 F.2d 971, 978 (8th Cir. 1991) 
(quoting Woods v. Barnett Bank of Fort Lauderdale, 765 F.2d 1004, 1010 (11th 
Cir. 1985) (quoting Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 961-62 (5th Cir.) 
(en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981))); see Alpern v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 
84 F.3d 1525, 1534 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that recklessness satisfies scienter 
requirement); SEC v. Falbo, 14 F. Supp. 2d 508, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating that 
recklessness satisfies scienter requirement in a civil enforcement action). 
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol28/iss4/1
03_FLEMMING 4/18/2002  4:59 PM 
2002] INSIDER TRADING 1433 
intent to defraud. 
E.  Causation - the Use and Possession Controversy. 
There is a controversy whether Rule 10-5 liability requires 
proof of a causal connection between the material inside 
information and the insider’s trading.  In other words, does insider 
trading liability require proof that the trader actually “used” 
material nonpublic information in trading or merely that the 
trader had “knowing possession” of the information before trading? 
Some courts have required proof of actual use.71  At least one 
court has adopted the more lenient position promoted by the SEC, 
and required only proof of knowing possession.72 
In Adler, the SEC brought a civil action against a corporate 
officer of Comptronix Corporation, alleging insider trading and 
seeking treble damages.73  The officer had attended a board 
meeting where it was reported that Comptronix anticipated its 
largest customer would completely terminate or largely reduce its 
orders of product.74  After the meeting, the officer proceeded to 
sell 20,000 out of his 869,897 shares of stock.75 
The officer brought a motion for summary judgment, asserting 
that he had sold his shares as part of a preexisting plan, not as a 
result of material non-public information.76  He introduced 
evidence that he had discussed with his stock broker his plan to sell 
the stock before the board meeting, and had also obtained 
approval for the sale from the company’s general counsel.77  In 
addition, he sold the stock on the last day of the lockup period for 
Comptronix’s initial public offering.  The district court granted the 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, determining that the 
officer had rebutted any reasonable inference that he acted with 
the requisite scienter.78 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the officer, but rejected the SEC’s argument 
that mere possession of non-public information by an insider who 
 
 71. United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 1998); SEC v. 
Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1342-43 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 72. United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 73. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1327-32. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1329. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
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trades in the company’s stock is sufficient to establish liability 
under Section 10(b).79  The court concluded that the “in 
connection with the purchase or sale of a security” requirement of 
Section 10(b) “suggests a focus on fraud, deception, and 
manipulation” and that the “use standard” “best comports” with 
this language.80  The court reasoned that the “use” test is 
appropriate because it is only in trading on the basis of material 
nonpublic information that an insider breaches any fiduciary duty 
and derives personal gain.81 
The Adler court recognized that it is often difficult to prove 
that an insider actually uses material non-public information to 
trade.  In an effort to alleviate this problem, the court created a 
refutable evidentiary presumption that an insider uses material 
non-public information when he is in possession of such 
information and then trades.82 
Smith came to a similar resolution in an appeal from a criminal 
conviction in an insider trading case.83  The appellate issue related 
to the adequacy of a jury instruction that the government did not 
need to prove that the defendant sold his stock solely because of 
material nonpublic information, but rather that such information 
was a significant factor in the defendant’s decision to sell.  The 
Ninth Circuit found the jury instruction to be adequate, but 
rejected the government’s “knowing possession” standard and 
adopted the “use” standard.84  In doing so, the Ninth Circuit 
focused on the defendant’s use of material non-public information 
as a necessary fact to show scienter (This is different than the Adler 
court which focused on the defendant’s use of such information as 
a necessary fact to show a breach of fiduciary duty).  The court 
reasoned: 
[I]f the insider merely possesses and does not use [the 
information], the two parties are trading on a level 
playing field . . . both individuals are ‘making their 
decisions on the basis of incomplete information.’  It is 
the insider’s use, not his possession, that gives rise to an 
 
 79. Id. at 1344. 
 80. Id. at 1332-36. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See Id. at 1337 (“[W]hen an insider trades while in possession of material 
nonpublic information, a strong inference arises that such information was used 
by the insider in trading.”). 
 83. 155 F.3d 1051. 
 84. Id. at 1066-69. 
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informational advantage and the requisite intent to 
defraud.85 
In contrast to the Eleventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit declined 
to find that an evidentiary presumption exists that an insider uses 
material non-public information when he is in possession of such 
information and then trades.86 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals came to a contrary 
decision in United States v. Teicher,87 in which the court affirmed the 
convictions of tippee-arbitrageurs88 who traded after obtaining 
misappropriated information about unannounced tender offers 
from the associate of a law firm.  Although the Second Circuit 
accepted the government’s argument that “knowing possession” of 
undisclosed material information is sufficient to prove an insider 
trading claim, the court’s conclusion is largely dictum because the 
facts of the case showed actual use of the misappropriated 
information.  Indeed, the court found that it was “unnecessary to 
determine whether proof of securities fraud requires a causal 
connection” in light of the evidence presented.89 
In August 2000, the SEC implemented a new rule addressing 
this issue.90  The SEC’s new Rule 10b5-1 follows Teicher91 and adopts 
the “possession” standard, and provides that, for purposes of 
insider trading, a person trades on the basis of material nonpublic 
information if a trader is “aware” of the material nonpublic 
information when making the purchase or sale.92 
The rule creates affirmative defenses where it is clear that the 
information is not a factor in the decision to trade.  Rule 10(b)(5)-
1(c)(1) provides that a person’s trade is not made on the basis of 
material, non-public information if the person can demonstrate 
that, prior to becoming aware of that information, the person 
made arrangements to trade pursuant to a pre-existing contract, 
 
 85. Smith, 155 F.3d at 1068. 
 86. Compare United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1988) with SEC v. 
Adler, 137 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 87. 987 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 88. Arbitrage entails trading in securities in companies that are subject of 
changes in corporate control in order to take advantage of fluctuations in the 
price of these securities.  Id. at 114. 
 89. Id. at 119. 
 90. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, and 249 
(2000). 
 91. 987 F.2d 112. 
 92. 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243 and 249. 
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instruction or written plan.93  In order for these affirmative defenses 
to be available, the contract, instruction or plan must specify the 
amount of securities to be purchased or sold, the price at which the 
securities are to be purchased or sold, and the date on which the 
transaction is to occur.94 
The other affirmative defense is available only to entities.  Rule 
10(b)(5)-1(c)(2) provides that an entity’s trade is not made on the 
basis of material, non-public information if the entity can 
demonstrate that the person making the trade for the entity was 
not aware of the information and the entity had established 
“reasonable policies and procedures to ensure that the persons 
making the buy or sell decisions for it would not violate the laws 
prohibiting trading on the basis of material non-public 
information.”95 
The SEC has recently published a Telephone Interpretations 
Manual with frequently asked questions and answers about this new 
rule.96 
III. THE MORALITY OF INSIDER TRADING. 
The SEC has long targeted insider trading as a top 
enforcement priority.  One reason for this focus is the belief that 
insider trading destroys the integrity of the capital markets. 
There is, however, a contrarian view, that insider trading does 
not have a significant, adverse market impact.  The contrary 
position is that in light of the average trading volume, insider 
trading has no discernible impact on other investors.97  Moreover, 
the argument is made, insider trading performs a useful function 
by preparing the market and getting the market started in the 
proper direction before the information is publicly announced.98  
Otherwise, major announcements will cause wide price fluctuations 
that not only disrupt an orderly market but will cause more injury 
to outside investors than would the insider trading.99 
 
 93. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 94. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Manual of Publicly Available Telephone Interpretations at 
http://www.sec.gov/interps/telephone.shtml (last modified July 18, 2001). 
 97. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); see F. 
EASTERBROOK & D. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 251 
(1991). 
 98. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 97, at 251. 
 99. Id. 
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Of course the morality of insider trading does not depend on 
the market consequences of the trades but rather on the moral 
quality of the actions.  Indeed, it has been questioned whether 
insider trading should be prohibited, and if so, why: “While its 
answer requires more than a response of, ‘Yes, because the practice 
is unfair,’ courts, commentators, and the SEC alike have all had 
difficulty identifying what harms actually arise from trades based on 
material nonpublic information.”100 
There would appear to be at least two legitimate moral 
objections to insider trading.  First, there is a concern about 
fairness - that insider trading provides an unfair information 
advantage.  As an American Bar Association Task Force concluded: 
In our society, we traditionally abhor those who refuse to 
play by the rules, that is, the cheaters and the sneaks.  A 
spitball pitcher, or a card shark with an ace up his sleeve, 
may win the game but not our respect.  And if we know 
such a person is in the game, chances are we won’t play.  
These common sense observations suggest that two of the 
traditional bases for prohibitions against insider trading 
are still sound: the ‘fair play’ and ‘integrity of the markets’ 
arguments.101 
Second, there is a concern about the use of information 
obtained in breach of one’s fiduciary duty.  The wrong is the 
breach of the fiduciary duty - usually the taking of information 
provided for legitimate corporate purposes - and the use of that 
information in a secret and deceptive manner for another purpose 
– namely, the pecuniary benefit of the person breaching the 
fiduciary duty.102 
 
 100. Joseph J. Humke, Comment, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading: 
Outside The Lines of Section 10(b), 80 MARQ. L. REV. 819, 851 (1997). 
 101. Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task Force on 
Regulation of Insider Trading, 41 BUS. LAW 223, 227 (1985). 
 102. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907, 917-18 (1961).  Indeed, in Cady, 
Roberts & Co., the SEC focused on the existence of a relationship providing access 
to inside information intended for a corporate purpose, and the inherent 
unfairness when a corporate insider takes unfair advantage of such information 
knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.  Id. 
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IV. DEFENDING INSIDER TRADING CLAIMS. 
A.  Reliance on Counsel. 
An insider who consults with and relies on the advice of legal 
counsel prior to engaging in a trade may use those circumstances 
to demonstrate good faith and the lack of scienter.  Common sense 
dictates that a person who consults with experienced securities 
counsel in advance of a trade, explains the relevant background, 
and follows counsel’s advice, is acting prudently and without 
fraudulent intent. 
For example, in In re Digi International, Inc. Securities 
Litigation,103 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district 
court order granting defendants summary judgment in a class 
action alleging securities fraud.  The appellate court found that “no 
reasonable jury could find the necessary element of scienter,” 
reasoning, “[t]he undisputable fact that the Defendants were in 
consultations with their outside accountants and legal counsel 
during the period in question is in itself evidence which tends to 
negate a finding of scienter.”104 
Courts have carefully distinguished between criminal and civil 
cases in mapping out the contours of this defense.  Thus, although 
in a criminal case, good faith reliance on the counsel may rebut a 
showing of intent,105 in a civil case, reliance on counsel is “not a 
complete defense, but only one factor for consideration.”106 
To rely on this defense, a defendant must prove that he 
(1)  made complete disclosure to counsel; 
(2)  sought advice as to the legality of his conduct; 
(3) received advice that his conduct was legal; and 
(4) relied on that advice in good faith.107 
Merely talking with counsel is not enough.  For example, in 
Enterprises Solutions, the CEO of a public company failed to disclose 
in a registration statement that a prior company he managed had 
filed for bankruptcy.108  He admitted that fact was material, but 
 
 103. 14 Fed. Appx. 714, 2001 WL 753869 (8th Cir. July 5, 2001). 
 104. Id. at 718 (quoting In re Digi Int’l Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 97-5, slip op. at 15 
n.7 (D. Minn. Aug. 17, 2000) (modification in original)). 
 105. United States v. Evangelista, 122 F.3d 112, 117 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 106. Markowski v. SEC, 34 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 107. SEC v. Enters. Solutions, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 561, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(citing Markowski, 34 F.3d at 105). 
 108. Id. at 571. 
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contended he disclosed that fact to in-house counsel, and relied on 
them to include that information in the registration statement.109  
The court rejected the reliance on counsel defense here, reasoning 
that the defense requires “more than simply supplying counsel with 
information.”110  The court determined that corporate officers have 
an independent duty to insure that material information is 
disclosed, and that “[c]ompliance with federal securities laws 
cannot be avoided by simply retaining outside counsel to prepare 
required documents.”111  Presumably, courts would come to the 
same conclusion in an insider trading case - mere consultation with 
counsel would not provide a defense. 
Consultation with counsel in advance of a trade is no panacea.  
Certainly if counsel provides an unequivocal “green light” to client 
contemplating a trade, the client may well be able to rely on such 
advice to show good faith and disprove alleged intent to defraud.  
But experience suggests that those circumstances are rare.  Prudent 
counsel in many cases may need to alert clients to the risk that 
trading may result in insider trading liability, depending upon a 
laundry list of circumstances, or suggest that the conservative 
advice is to abstain from the contemplated trades altogether.  
Presumably, a lawyer who fails to do so would risk exposure to 
malpractice liability if these qualifications and risks were not 
provided.  Of course, if a client subsequently attempts to rely on 
the prior advice of counsel as a defense to insider trading claims, 
the attorney-client privilege would be waived, and all the 
qualifications or risks addressed by counsel could be used against 
the client, and in a devastating manner. 
It is not even entirely clear whether the advice of counsel to 
engage in the trade - in the event of a subsequent insider trading 
prosecution - would remain privileged and confidential regardless 
of whether the good faith defense is raised. 
In sum, the defense of reliance on counsel may be a 
meritorious defense to insider trading liability.  Unfortunately for 
persons accused of insider trading, as a practical matter the defense 
is rarely available. 
 
 109. Id. at 576. 
 110. Id. at 571. 
 111. Id. 
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B.  Pre-existing Plans, Contracts or Instructions. 
See discussion above. 
C.  Adherence to Company Plans or Policies. 
It is certainly indicative of good faith if an individual openly 
and deliberately follows an employer’s insider trading policies.  The 
1988 Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act 
(ITSFEA) requires registered brokers, dealers, and investment 
advisors to “establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and 
procedures reasonably designed” to prevent insider trading by their 
employees.112  While other employers are not required to maintain 
these written policies, they also face increased exposure from the 
SEC and private litigants.  The new law broadens control person 
liability, increasing the economic incentives for such persons to 
supervise their employees vigorously. 
The SEC has informally suggested that employers, especially 
law firms and public companies, adopt appropriate procedures to 
prevent unlawful insider trading. 
Several provisions of ITSFEA are of special concern to 
employees: (1) the SEC can seek civil penalties from an employer 
whose personnel are guilty of illegal insider trading if the employee 
was reckless; and (2) if an employer failed to take preventive 
measures, although otherwise unknowing and innocent, it may be 
found reckless. 
As an example, a typical insider trading policy may include the 
following provisions: 
1. Prohibit buying or selling of client securities without 
authorization. 
2. Prohibit buying or selling of securities on a restricted list 
(which may include some non-clients) without authorization. 
3. Ban the buying or selling of options based upon client 
securities or restricted list securities. 
4. Ban short sales of client securities or restricted list securities. 
5. Require periodic reporting of purchases and sales. 
If an employee follows an employer’s insider trading rules, 
this should be one factor showing good faith. 
 
 112. Insider Trading & Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-704, 102 Stat. 4677, 4680. 
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D.  Proving Conduct was Legitimate - Rebutting the Circumstantial 
Evidence Case. 
Most insider trading cases are based on circumstantial rather 
than direct evidence, especially with regard to the trader’s intent to 
defraud.  It is the nature of insider trading that there are rarely 
witnesses with first-hand knowledge available, much less writings 
that precisely relate what happened and why.  Also, persons 
deliberately engaging in illegal insider trading often take some 
steps to conceal their activities before and after the trades.  Insider 
trading cases are frequently based entirely on circumstantial 
evidence because: 
[T]here are generally two people who can provide direct 
evidence that insider trading has occurred –- the source of 
the information and the trader.  It is very rare for one of 
these two persons to admit that they have engaged in 
insider trading.  Most cases are based largely on 
circumstantial evidence.113 
Courts, recognizing this practical reality, are hospitable to 
circumstantial cases.  It is difficult to obtain dismissal on the 
pleadings or summary judgment in insider trading cases because of 
this hospitable environment for circumstantial claims, and the fact-
bound nature of the key issues of materiality, the non-public nature 
of the information and intent.  Accordingly, persons defending 
against insider trading claims frequently face the decision of 
settling the claims, or litigating the cases at trial. 
United States v. Larrabee114 is a good recent example of the 
circumstantial evidence case against a legal professional.  Larrabee 
was employed in the business office of a Boston law firm.  He was 
responsible for selecting the stockbrokers who placed securities 
trades for the trust accounts managed by the firm.  Larrabee 
developed a personal and financial relationship with D’Angelo, a 
stock broker at PaineWebber, Inc.115 
In December 1995, the law firm represented Bank of Boston in 
a merger transaction with BayBanks.  Larrabee had daily contact 
with John Brown, one of the firm’s lawyers involved in the 
transaction.  On December 12, 1995, Larabee called D’Angelo and 
 
 113. Elysian Fed. Sav. Bank v. First Interregional Equity Corp., 713 F. Supp. 
737, 744 (D.N.J. 1989) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 15 (1988)). 
 114. 240 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 115. Id. at 19. 
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they spoke for about one minute.  Thereafter, D’Angelo entered 
orders to buy 11,000 shares of BayBanks stock priced at $85 per 
share for his own account, for his family members’ account and his 
girlfriend’s account.  After the market closed that day, Bank of 
Boston and BayBanks announced their merger.  The next day, 
BayBank’s stock price increased by $8 per share before the market 
opened.  D’Angelo immediately placed orders to sell the stock he 
had purchased the evening before, resulting in profits of about 
$86,750.116 
A criminal insider trading prosecution ensued against 
Larrabee and D’Angelo, and both men were convicted on nine 
counts of securities fraud.  On appeal, the court found that there 
was compelling evidence to support Larrabee’s conviction, 
including these factors: 
1. Access to information; 
2. Relationship between the tipper and tippee; 
3. Timing of contact between the tipper and tippee; 
4. Timing of the trades; 
5. Pattern of the trades; and 
6. Attempts to conceal either the trades or the relationship 
between the tipper and the tippee.117 
These are similar to the circumstantial factors consistently 
relied upon by courts in denying summary judgment motions and 
upholding liability determinations. 
V. CONCLUSION. 
As a very practical matter, defending legal and financial 
advisors in these cases requires a concerted effort to prove the 
trader’s conduct was legitimate, and, in Emily Dickinson’s 
language, to provide a legitimate slant on these same circumstantial 
factors.  Clear timelines, legitimate business and personal reasons 
for the transactions, other sources of information and other 
reasons for the transaction, prior investment patterns, 
conformance with professional and industry practices, 
conformance with statutory and company policies, consultation 
with professionals, and the absence of concealment are helpful 
elements of such a defense. 
 
 
 116. Id. at 20. 
 117. Id. at 21-22. 
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